The equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) can be looked on as a generalization of Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) and the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) whose constraints contain a parametric variational inequality or complementarity system. In this paper, we particularly consider a special class of EPECs where a common parametric P-matrix linear complementarity system is contained in all players' strategy sets. After reformulating the EPEC as an equivalent NEP, we use a smoothing method to construct a sequence of smoothed NEPs that approximate the original problem. We consider two solution concepts, global Nash equilibrium and stationary Nash equilibrium, and establish some results about the convergence of approximate Nash equilibria.
Introduction
In the classical Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) [17, 18] , all players choose their own strategies simultaneously under their respective constraints and try to minimize their own objective functions noncooperatively. In the Stackelberg (single-leader-follower) game [16, 22] , there exists a distinctive player (called the leader) who can anticipate the responses of the other players (called the followers) and select his optimal strategy. At the same time, given the leader's strategy, all the followers complete with each other in the Nash noncooperative way.
To deal with the Stackelberg game, one can formulate it as a bilevel optimization problem, which may further be reformulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [16] , where the lower level problem is parametrized by the upper level strategy. As a generalization of the MPEC, the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) can be formulated as a problem that consists of several MPECs, for which one seeks an equilibrium point that is achieved when all MPECs are optimized simultaneously. The EPEC can be looked on as a formulation of a noncooperative multi-leader-follower game [20] . Several researchers have presented some practical applications of the EPEC, such as electricity markets [10, 11, 20] . However, only a few attempts have been made so far to develop numerical methods to solve EPECs, even for a special class of problems.
In the study on optimization, one of important subjects is the approximation of optimization problems. In particular, the notion of epiconvergence of functions plays a fundamental role [13, 21] . Recently, Gürkan and Pang [9] introduced a new notion of epiconvergence, which is called multi-epiconvergence, to study the approximation of Nash equilibrium problems. It is an extension of the notion of epiconvergence to a sequence of families of functions. By means of the new notion, the authors of [9] presented a sufficient condition to ensure the convergence of approximate global Nash equilibria.
In view of the difficulty in computing global Nash equilibria of EPECs that lack convexity, it is reasonable to consider the stationarity in the players' optimization problems. For example, Hu and Ralph [11] propose two solution concepts called local Nash equilibrium and Nash stationary equilibrium, which are based on local optimality and stationarity, respectively, in each leader's MPEC.
Inspired by their idea and the recent work of Chen and Fukushima [1] , in this paper, we consider a special class of EPECs with shared equilibrium constraints formulated as a linear complementarity system. Under some particular assumptions on the linear complementarity system, we show that the EPEC can be reformulated as a NEP. By means of a smoothing technique, we further construct a sequence of smoothed NEPs to approximate this NEP. We consider two solution concepts, global Nash equilibrium and stationary Nash equilibrium, and establish some results about the convergence of approximate Nash equilibria. Moreover, we present some numerical examples for this special class of EPECs.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we collect some basic definitions and present some preliminary results that will be used later. In Section 3, we introduce the particular EPEC considered in the paper, and reformulate it as a NEP. We also introduce a sequence of NEPs by means of a smoothing technique to approximate this NEP. In Section 4, we show some conditions that ensure the convergence of approximate global Nash equilibria. We further consider the approximation of stationary Nash equilibria and show some corresponding results about convergence in Section 5. Next, in Section 6, we present some numerical examples. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 7.
Notations: The gradient ∇f (x) of a differentiable function f : R n → R is regarded as a column vector. Furthermore, we denote the n × m (transposed) Jacobian matrix of a differentiable function F : R n → R m at a given point x by ∇F (x). For a real-valued function f (x, y)
with variables x ∈ R n and y ∈ R m , the partial gradients with respect to x and y are denoted by
A vector is regarded as a column vector.
However, if a vector x is composed of several subvectors
T , where T denotes transposition.
We also use N to denote the set of natural numbers.
Preliminaries

EPECs with Shared Equilibrium Constraints
In this subsection, we describe a class of EPECs with shared equilibrium constraints and define global and stationary Nash equilibria of the EPECs.
First, we start with the definitions of solution concepts for NEPs. In a NEP, denoted by
, there are N players labelled by integers ν = 1, · · · , N . Player ν's strategy is denoted by vector x ν ∈ R nν and his cost functionθ ν (x) depends on all players' strategies, which are collectively denoted by the vector x ∈ R n consisting of subvectors
nν is independent of the other players' strategies which are denoted collectively as x 
where we writeθ
) to emphasize the role of x ν in this problem. A tuple
On the other hand, a tuple of strategies x * is called a stationary Nash Equilibrium if for all ν = 1, · · · , N , x * ,ν is a stationary point for the optimization problem (1) with
where a stationary point means that it satisfies a first-order optimality condition for the problem.
Assuming the differentiability of the cost functionsθ ν and the convexity of the strategy sets X ν , a stationary Nash equilibrium is characterized as a tuple x * = (x * ,ν ) N ν=1 ∈ X that satisfies the following conditions for all ν = 1, · · · , N :
If, in addition,θ ν are convex for all ν, then a stationary Nash equilibrium reduces to a global Nash equilibrium. Whenθ ν is nondifferentiable, we need to introduce a more general notion of stationarity, as will be done in Section 5.
Recall that a typical MPEC can be defined as the following optimization problem with two sets of variables, the upper level variables x ∈ R n and the lower level variables y ∈ R m :
where θ : R n+m → R, X ⊆ R n , and for each x ∈ X, S(x) is the solution set of an equilibrium problem with parameter x, which may be represented as a variational inequality problem (VIP) or a complementarity problem (CP).
As a generalization of the MPEC, the EPEC can be formulated as a problem where several players try to solve their own MPECs simultaneously. In particular, we consider an EPEC where N players share the same equilibrium constraints as follows. 
where
) is the solution set of an equilibrium problem with parameter x, which may be represented as a VIP or a CP.
Epiconvergence
In this subsection, we present some basic definitions and properties about epiconvergence and multi-epiconvergence of functions. First, we begin with the following definitions.
The theory of set convergence provides a convenient tool to study the approximation issues in optimization. In particular, we can define the concept of epiconvergence through the convergence of epigraphs.
For checking the epiconvergence, the following proposition is useful. 
It is easy to see from (4) that we have actually 
converging to x, and to converge continuously on X ⊂ R n if this is true at every x ∈ X.
The next proposition gives a sufficient condition for a sequence of functions to epiconverge. 
The concept of epiconvergence plays an essential role in studying approximation issues for optimization problems. To study approximation issues for NEPs, which contain multiple objective functions associated with all players' optimization problems, Gürkan and Pang [9] introduced the concept of multi-epiconvergence for a sequence of families of functions, as a generalization of epiconvergence. , where
if the following two conditions
hold for every ν = 1, · · · , N and every
(a) For every sequence {x
The following proposition establishes the strong relation between multi-epiconvergence and epiconvergence. 
Under the assumption of multi-epiconvergence, the following proposition shows a sufficient condition for the convergence of approximate Nash equilibria. 
P-Matrix Linear Complementarity Problem
The complementarity problem (CP) is to find a vector x ∈ R n such that
n is a continuous function. In particular, when F is an affine function represented by F (x) =M x +q, whereM ∈ R n×n andq ∈ R n , the CP becomes the linear complementarity problem (LCP), which is to find a vector x ∈ R n such that
We denote this problem as LCP(M ,q).
MatrixM ∈ R n×n is said to be a P-matrix, if its all principal minors are positive, or equiv-
The following proposition is well known.
Proposition 2.10. [3] A matrixM ∈ R n×n is a P-matrix if and only if LCP(M ,q) has a unique
solution for any vectorq ∈ R n .
Equilibrium Problem with Shared P-matrix Linear Complementarity
Constraints
In this paper, we consider the particular class of EPECs, where each player's optimization problem contains a P-matrix linear complementarity constraint that is common to all players.
Specifically, for ν = 1, · · · , N , given the other players' strategies x −ν , player ν solves the following problem:
continuously differentiable and convex functions, and h
, which is convex under the given assumptions on g ν and h ν . The shared linear complementarity constraints
and q ∈ R m . In particular, we assume that M is a P-matrix. By Proposition 2.10, for any fixed
Now we define the concept of global Nash equilibria for EPEC {(5)}
). It is well known that the solution function
m of the shared P-matrix linear complementarity problem (6) is piecewise linear with respect to the parameter x [16] . Since every piecewise linear function is globally Lipschitz, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. [1]
There is a positive number γ such that
We define the functions 
Since y(·) is not differentiable, problem (7) is a nonsmooth optimization problem for each ν.
thanks to the property of Pmatrix. This is made precise in the following proposition.
Proof. To prove the first half, suppose to the contrary that (x * , y(x * )) is not a global Nash equi-
that is,
This contradicts the assmuption that x * is global Nash equilibrium of NEP(
. Thus the first half is proved.
The second half can be proved in a similar manner, and hence the proof is omitted.
It is well known that the complementarity problem (6) can be reformulated as the following system of nonsmooth equations:
→ R is a function called an NCP function or a complementarity function [5] that satisfies the condition
There are many NCP functions. In this paper, we use the Fischer-Burmeister (FB) function [6] defined by
Smoothing is an effective technique for solving optimization problems and complementarity problems [4, 7, 8, 19] . Here, we use a sequence of continuously differentiable functions {Φ µ } involving a scalar parameter µ > 0 to approximate the nonsmooth function Φ :
and φ µ : R 2 → R is the smoothing Fischer-Burmeister function [14] defined by
It is easy to see that
By virtue of the P-matrix property of M , for any fixed x, the nonlinear equation
has a unique solution y, see [1] , which we denote y µ (x). Compared with the solution function y(·) of the original LCP, the function y µ (·) has some desirable properties.
Proposition 3.4. [1]
There is a positive constant κ such that for any x ∈ R n and µ > µ ≥ 0,
we have
Particularly, when µ = 0, we have 
where ∂y(x) is the Clarke generalized Jacobian of y(·) atx.
In view of this result, we assume that, for any ν and any sequence {x
where ∂ x ν y(x) denotes the Clarke generalized partial Jacobian with respect to x ν of y(·) atx.
For any µ > 0, we consider a family of functions
, where the functions
By Proposition 3.5, the functions Θ ν (·; µ) are continuously differentiable for any µ > 0. Let
As an approximation to the NEP(
, we may consider the sequence of NEPs, denoted
Convergence of Approximate Global Nash Equilibria
In this section, we focus on the convergence of global Nash equilibria for the sequence 
and hence we have 
and
Then we have the following lemmas about functions Ψ ν,k and Ψ ν .
Lemma 4.2.
For each ν and k, the functions Ψ ν and Ψ ν,k are continuous on X.
)), the continuity of these functions follows from the continuity of functions ∈ X −ν , the sequence of functions {Ψ ν,k } k∈N defined by (12) epiconverges to the function Ψ ν defined by (13) . It is true as mentioned just after Lemma 4.3.
Based on this result, we establish convergence of the approximate global Nash equilibria. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 2.9.
Convergence of Approximate Stationary Nash Equilibria
In this section, we further investigate the behavior of a sequence of stationary Nash equi- 
, is defined as follows:
Based on the concepts of B-stationary point and C-stationary point for a nonsmooth optimization problem, we introduce the corresponding concepts for a nonsmooth NEP as follows.
We call x ∈ X a Bouligand stationary (B-stationary) Nash equilibrium
for all d 
Under the MFCQ, the tangent cone T (x ν ; X ν ) can be represented precisely as follows: 
Since function y µ (·) is continuously differentiable on R n for any µ > 0, the B-stationarity
can be written as follows:
Moreover, for each k, we say
Note that under the MFCQ, conditions (16) and (17) are equivalent.
Now we establish the following result about the convergence of a sequence of KKT points of 
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the feasible set
By (9) 
Since the MFCQ holds atx, it is not difficult to show that the sequence {(λ
bounded. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Then, for each ν = 1, · · · , N , it follows from (18) that
By the continuous differentiability of function θ ν for each ν, the Jacobian chain rule [2, Theorem 2.6.6] yields
This along with (19) means that (15) holds for all ν = 1, · · · , N with (x, λ, µ) = (x,λ,μ).
Therefore,x is a C-stationary Nash equilibrium of NEP(
Now we consider some properties about the B-stationary points. 
.
) and a subsequence of {x
Further, for any d
, by the MFCQ, there exists a sequence {d
Then, by passing to the limit k → ∞ in (16), we can deduce that
Since this holds for all d
; X), the desired result follows.
In the light of Lemma 5.2, we show a convergence result about B-stationary Nash equilibria.
To this end, we introduce the following concept.
and satisfies 
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that the feasible set
. Moreover, by the Jacobian chain rule [2, Theorem 2.6.6], we have
Further, by the regularity of Θ ν and [2, Proposition 2.1.2 (b)], we also have
Therefore, in view of (20) and (21), we can deduce that
Since this holds for all ν = 1, · · · , N ,x is a B-stationary Nash
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we show some numerical results for the class of EPECs described in Section 3. Specifically, we consider the following EPEC with two players, which contains a shared P-matrix linear complementarity constraint parameterized by the upper level variables
Player I's problem:
Player II's problem:
We assume that M ∈ R m×m is a P-matrix, H ν ∈ R m×n ν are symmetric positive definite matrices, and
In light of the analysis in the previous sections, we can further reformulate this EPEC as the following nonsmooth NEP:
Moreover, we have the following sequence of smoothed approximations to the above NEP:
By concatenating their KKT conditions, we have the following mixed CP for each k:
It is well-known that a mixed CP is equivalent to a box constrained variational inequality problem (BVIP) [5] . Consequently, to deal with the above mixed CP, we consider the following BVIP: Find a vector z = (x, λ) ∈ B such that
The Jacobian matrix of function F µ k (z) can be written as
To solve the BVIP, Kanzow and Fukushima [15] . Example 6.1. The problem data are given as follows: Table 1 .
We confirm that these approximate stationary Nash equilibria of smoothed NEPs converge to a B-stationary Nash equilibrium of the original NEP as µ k tends to 0. In fact, since y(x) Table 2 and Table 3 .
For these two exampls, we may observe the similar properties to those of Example 6.1. As µ k tends to 0, we confirm that these approximate stationary Nash equilibria of smoothed NEPs also converge to a B-stationary Nash equilibrium of the original NEP. In fact, in Example 6. This indicates that we can look on x k as an approximate B-stationary Nash equilibrium of the original NEP.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an approach to deal with a special class of EPECs, where the players share a parametric P-matrix linear complementarity constraint. Exploiting the good properties of a P-matrix, we have reformulated the EPEC as an equivalent NEP with nonsmooth objective functions. We have further employed a smoothing method to construct a sequence of smoothed NEPs to approximate the original NEP. We have established some convergence results about the approximate global Nash equilibria and approximate stationary Nash equilibria.
We have confirmed the validity of the proposed approach through numerical experiments.
